Volume 60

Issue 1

Article 9

December 1957

Constitutional Law--Military Courts Martial--Trial of Civilians
C. R. S.
West Virginia University College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Military, War, and Peace Commons

Recommended Citation
C. R. S., Constitutional Law--Military Courts Martial--Trial of Civilians, 60 W. Va. L. Rev. (1957).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol60/iss1/9

This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research
Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The
Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.

S.: Constitutional Law--Military Courts Martial--Trial of Civilians
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-MTrARY CouRTS MAnTx,-TruAL OF
CrviAms.-A and B were wives of American servicemen who accompanied their husbands overseas, and were living on military
reservations with their husbands in a dependent status. Each killed
her husband and was tried for murder by military court martial.
The conviction of each was affirmed by the Supreme Court in a
consolidated hearing. Held, on rehearing by the Supreme Court,
that there was no constitutional basis for extending the jurisdiction
of military courts martial to civilians accompanying service members in a dependent status. Reid v. Covert, 77 Sup. Ct. 1222 (1957).

The basic issue in the principal case is whether military authority can be extended to civilians accompanying the armed
forces. The decision rendered by the Supreme Court is unfortunate from any point of view. There is no unanimity of opinion;
the case rationale is well-nigh impossible to discover and great
difficulty is anticipated in applying the case to any future decision. This situation is brought about by the fact that the Court,
itself, cannot agree as to the result. There is a majority result,
but no majority opinion. There are four opinions, in fact. One of
these might best be characterized as the plurality opinion, and is
delimited by two concurring opinions. The fourth opinion is a
dissent.
The resultant confusing state of affairs is further muddled by
the fact that the opinions reversed the position of the Court
delivered 364 days before. It is noteworthy that Mr. Justice Harlan
reversed his own stand of the preceding year, on the general ground
that he had had more time for reflection in the interim. See
Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 470 (1956).
To advance into specifics, the tempest was aroused by the
granting of jurisdiction to military courts in cases arising without
the United States involving persons "serving with, employed by,
or accompanying" the armed forces. Art. 11(2), Uniform Code of
Military Justice; 50 U.S. C. § 552(11) (1949). This may seem, on
first sight, like a new provision, but military authorities had power
over certain civilians at the time the Constitution was framed. The
Articles of War adopted June 30, 1775, provided that, "All suttlers
and retailers to a camp and all persons whatsoever, serving with
the Continental Army" were subject to that army's regulations.
Wnmoo, M=ITARY LAW A
PREcEDENTs 956 (2d ed. 1920). The
problem arising is whether trial of civilians must be by Article III
court, i.e., one which is established under the provision of Article III
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of the Constitution, in which trial is by jury; and whether the safeguards of the fifth and sixth amendments must follow the civilian.
The Court has held that the above provisions are not necessary in cases arising without the United States. In re Ross, 140 U.S.
53 (1890). Although not involving the military, the Ross case
included the same considerations, although the power in question
was consular rather than military. The main opinion of the principal case disposes of the Ross case rather summarily, inferring it
to be a dead issue, and giving as some basis for this the fact that
consular authority to try civilians has been ended. It would be
well to point out that the President was given authority to end
such consular courts, and did so in 1956, but he was under no
compulsion-constitutional or otherwise-to do so. 22 U.S.C. § 141
(1956).
One other line of cases, known collectively as the Insular
Cases, also allowed trial of civilians in non-Article III courts.
Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1921); Dorr v. United States,
195 U.S. 138 (1903); Territory of Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197
(1902); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1900). These cases
arose in the territorial possessions of the United States and the distinguishing factor according to the present Court is that these
cases arose under the power of the United States to make laws
concerning territories, and the permissive reason was that the territories had been under different systems of law, making it a practical necessity to administer justice under the prior territorial laws.
U. S. CONST. art. IV, §3, cl. 2. By the same reasoning, the Court
could have based a decision in the principal case, contra to that
actually rendered, on the power of the United States to govern
the military forces. U. S. CONST. art. 1, §8, cl. 14. They chose
otherwise. The clause in its entirety states that the government shall
have power "To make Rules for the Government and Regulation
of the land and naval Forces." The court has recognized that the
phrase, "in the land and naval Forces," did not necessarily restrict
its application to uniformed personnel. Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S.
109 (1895). The Court has, at this time, apparently decided to
adopt a restrictive view of the power, and give clause 14 a literal
interpretation. They imply this must be done. It is not too farfetched to see that if this literal interpretation were necessary, it
might take a constitutional amendment for courts martial to try
cases arising in the air forces, in view of the restriction of the clause
to land and naval forces. The Supreme Court had no difficulty in
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expanding the scope of federal power in other instances where
practicality was a consideration, e.g., the ever-widening scope of
the commerce clause. Cf. Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, 348 U.S.
61 (1954).
The principal case would appear to be one where practicality
is an overwhelming consideration. In addition to the disciplinary
problems posed by lack of control of civilians by military authorities, one prime consideration must be kept in mind: United States
citizens are not tried by the United States as a matter of right in
foreign countries, but entirely at the indulgence of the other country. The civilian is, for all practical purposes, indistinguishable in
the eyes of that country from members of the armed forces per se.
In this wise, it should be obvious that these countries will remove
the privilege of trial from the United States if it is abused. Although the principal case is authority for refusing court martial
of civilians in capital cases-or, at most, major cases-its reasoning
must be applied to lesser offenses, as well. There are many of these
lesser offenses which would not be tried by the United States, if
trial in the United States were necessary, due to the logistical problems involved. Clearly, if the United States will not try perpetrators
of these offenses, the foreign country will. Further, there are many
crimes which would not be tried at all, under such circumstances,
as they are not crimes in the other country, e.g., narcotics violations
in the Far East.
It appears that the framers of the Constitution had no such
qualms about military power as does the present court. There are
safeguards, to be sure, but these safeguards are primarily aimed at
divesting executive authority as to armed forces, and imposing the
authority in the legislative branch. It was felt that in this manner
the abuses felt under British rule would be obviated. Tim FEDEMEAST
No. 24 (Hamilton). Lest it be thought that Hamilton's view is of
no import; it should be stated that The Federalist has been relied
on to a great extent in interpreting the Constitution, in recent years
as well as the past. E.g., District of Columbia v. Thompson Co.,
346 U.S. 100, 109 (1953); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230
(1941).
From the foregoing discussion, it appears certain that the
Supreme Court could have chosen to allow trial of civilians by
court martial, had they so desired. They chose not to do so. Instead,
they have left but three alternatives, varying in degree of practicality, but alike in that all are less satisfactory than would be courts
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martial. They are: (1) trial in the United States with the attendant
logistical problems and, perhaps even more important, lack of authority for demanding the appearance of foreign nationals as witnesses; (2) trial by a foreign country with no guarantee of the safeguards deemed so important to the Court's decision; or (3) no
trial by either.
None of the three would appear as satisfactory as trial of
civilians by military court martial, which would be administered
by citizens of the United States, under United States law, with
procedure and safeguards controlled in their entirety by the
Congress of the United States.
C. R. S.
CoNsTrrunoNAL LAw-OBscENrTY.-This case involves two sep-

arate fact situations. In the first D was engaged in the publication
and sale of books, photographs, and magazines. He was convicted
of mailing obscene circulars and an obscene book in violation of
the federal obscenity statute. 64 STAT. 194, 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1950).
In the second case, D was convicted of keeping for sale obscene
and indecent books, and with composing obscene advertisements
of them in violation of the State Penal Code. CAL. PmA CODE, ANN.
§ 311 (West 1955). Held, affirming the convictions, that obscenity
is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press
guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amendments. Roth v. United
States, 77 Sup. Ct. 1304 (1957).
Expressions found in numerous opinions of the Supreme Court
demonstrate a tacit assumption that obscenity is not within the
area of free press protected by the first and fourteenth amendments.
Beauharniasv. Illinois, 343 U. S. 250 (1951); Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697 (1930); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877). Relying on this premise, the Court in the principal case attempts to
compound a test whereby it can determine whether matter is or is
not obscene, and consequently does little to clear up the already
confused state regarding obscenity. For nowhere in the law has
the search for a workable standard encountered more confusion
than in the attempt to find a test for determining whether a publication is or is not obscene. Marks, What Is Obscenity Today?,
73 U.S.L. REV. 217 (1939).
One of the earliest tests of obscenity was adopted in Regina
v. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868). It allowed material to be judged
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